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INTRODUCTION 
Courts and legal scholars regularly debate and criticize the 
deleterious effects of frivolous litigation.  These lawsuits needless tax 
litigants, wastefully drain judicial resources, and potentially stymie 
society and the economy as a whole.1  As a result, ethical, procedural 
 * J.D., LLM (Antitrust); Assistant Attorney General, New York State Attorney 
General’s Office, Antitrust Bureau.  The views expressed here are those of the author and do 
not reflect those of the New York State Department of Law or the Antitrust Bureau. 
 1. For a summary of common criticisms pertaining to frivolous litigation, see, e.g., 
John Lande, Failing Faith in Litigation? A Survey of Business Lawyers’ and Executives’ 
729 
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and substantive rules have been crafted to attempt to deter these ill- 
favored actions.2  However, many fail to consider that frivolous 
litigation may also be employed as a tactic to hinder competition. 
Frivolous litigation may have detrimental effects beyond the 
litigants involved and courts.  In certain situations, such litigation may 
harm competition by adversely effecting conduct of other (non-
litigating) market participants, such as suppliers, distributors, 
purchasers, and even consumers.  Consequently, it has long been held 
that objectively baseless—or “sham”—litigation that is done to impede 
competition and which has that effect may violate the antitrust laws.3  
Nonetheless, many scholars and courts continue to underrate or even 
overlook the injury caused by anticompetitive sham litigation.  This 
article uses the nomenclature “antitrust sham litigation” to refer to 
antitrust claims (or counterclaims) predicated on sham litigation. 
Antitrust challenges to sham litigation arise in various contexts 
involving a variety of factual and legal claims.  However, one 
commonality is that many such cases appear to focus exclusively on 
the time the case was initially filed.4  That is, the crux of the claim is 
that at the time filed, the lawsuit was baseless and filed for an improper 
purpose.5  Indeed, the author is not aware of any reported, successfully 
litigated case where an antitrust claim was based on a party 
maintaining a baseless lawsuit.6  As modern litigation is often lengthy, 
complex, and resource intensive, it is not improbable that, regardless of 
the merits of the action when filed, at some point in the litigation 
process, it may become manifestly evident that no reasonable litigant 
could expect success on the merits.  And at that point, maintaining the 
action is likely to be objectively baseless and unjustifiable. 
Opinions, 3 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 26 (1998); Valerie P. Hans & William S. Lofquist, 
Jurors’ Judgments of Business Liability in Tort Cases: Implications for the Litigation 
Explosion Debate, 26 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 85, 95 (1992); John W. Wade, On Frivolous 
Litigation:  A Study of Tort Liability and Procedural Sanctions, 14 HOFSTRA L.REV. 433, 
433 (1986). 
 2. See infra Parts II and III.  
 3. See, e.g., Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures, Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 
62 (1993); Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 511 (1972); 
Primetime 24 Joint Venture v. Nat’l Broadcasting Corp., Inc., 219 F.3d 92, 100–01 (2d Cir. 
2000).   
4. See, e.g., Handgards Inc. v. Ethicon Inc., 743 F.2d 1282, 1288–89 (9th Cir. 1984); 
Nabi Biopharmaceuticals v. Roxane Labs, No. 2:05-CV-889, 2007 WL 894473, at *2 (S.D. 
Ohio Mar. 21, 2007). 
 5. See id. 
 6. While the author is aware of cases where both the filing and maintaining the action 
was alleged to be a sham, those opinions focus primarily on the filing of the suit (possibly 
because if it is found that the litigation was a sham when filed, maintaining it was certainly 
so as well).  See id.  
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Continuing to litigate a baseless lawsuit with the purpose and 
effect of impeding competition may violate the antitrust laws.  As an 
example, in the context of pharmaceuticals, branded drug 
manufacturers often sue generic drug manufactures for patent 
infringement.  In many of these cases, an antitrust claim is made 
against the branded drug manufacturer, alleging that the infringement 
litigation was objectively baseless and made solely for the purpose of 
delaying generic competition.  And while antitrust challenges to sham 
litigation are not limited to the pharmaceutical context, for several 
reasons these cases are particularly useful in revealing potential 
anticompetitive effects of sham litigation.  First, the rising costs of 
prescription drugs has long been an issue of national concern.7  And 
because generic drugs are usually substantially cheaper than their 
branded counterparts, encouraging vigorous generic competition offers 
a means of reducing these costs.  Second, the focus of the dispute, i.e. 
whether a generic drug infringes upon a branded drug’s patents, 
suggests that in certain situations the inquiry need not be extensive.  
For instance, a cursory comparison of the generic’s product (or 
method) to the patented formulation (or method) may be all that is 
necessary to demonstrate non-infringement.8  Third, because of certain 
intrinsic features of its regulatory framework, pharmaceuticals is an 
area where proving anticompetitive effects of sham litigation may be 
relatively easy (i.e., compared to in other contexts).9  Indeed, the 
pharmaceutical industry has long been criticized as an industry in 
which companies have been able to successfully manipulate the 
regulatory process with anticompetitive results.10  Part II provides a 
 7. E.g.,Elizabeth Rosenthal, The Soaring Price of a Simple Breath, N.Y. Times. Oct. 
13, 2013 at A1 (finding that drug costs are 10% of the country’s $2.7 trillion annual health 
bill).  According to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Center for 
Medicare & Medicaid Service, retail prescription drug spending in 2012 was about $263.3 
billion.  See National Health Expenditure 2012 Highlights, CTR. FOR MEDICARE & 
MEDICAID SERVS., (Jan. 9, 2013, 8:34 AM), http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-
and-Systems/ 
Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/Downloads/ 
highlights.pdf. 
 8. See, e.g., AstraZeneca AB v. Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories, Ltd., No. 07 Civ. 
6790(CM), 2010 WL 1375176, at *4–5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2010).  Concededly, 
infringement analysis is often not a simple task. 
 9. See infra Part IIB, discussing how the mere filing of litigation by a branded drug 
manufacturer may delay approval of a generic version of the drug—and  thus the cost 
reductions associated with generic competition—for at least 30 months. 
 10. See, e.g., Caraco Pharm. Laboratories v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1676 
(2012) (“In the late 1990’s, evidence mounted that some brands were exploiting this [Hatch-
Waxman] statutory scheme to prevent or delay the marketing of generic drugs . . .”); 
JEREMY BULOW, The Gaming of Pharmaceutical Patents, in 4 INNOVATION POLICY AND 
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basic overview of applicable legal principles, i.e., antitrust, patents, 
pharmaceuticals, and laws governing frivolous litigation.11  Part III 
discusses pharmaceutical cases where the litigation is alleged  to be a 
sham due to non-infringement (rather than because of patent invalidity, 
fraud or inequitable conduct).12  Part IV provides an analysis and 
makes the case for antitrust liability for maintaining baseless litigation 
in appropriate circumstances.13  Finally, Part V offers a short 
conclusion.14 
II. BACKGROUND OF APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES 
The following provides a short background on the applicable laws 
and legal principles.  In addition to antitrust and patents, a brief 
summary of laws governing pharmaceuticals and frivolous litigation is 
provided. 
A. Antitrust Law & Sham Litigation 
The antitrust laws are intended to protect competition and 
consumers.15  The Sherman Act is the cornerstone of these laws and 
has been evaluating whether conduct is anticompetitive for well over a 
hundred years.16  It proscribes both joint conduct among firms that 
“unreasonably” harms competition17 as well as “monopolization.”18  In 
THE ECONOMY 145 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds. 2004); Elizabeth Powell-Bullock, Gaming 
the Hatch-Waxman System: How Pioneer Drug Makers Exploit the Law to Maintain 
Monopoly Power in the Prescription Drug Market. 29 J. LEGIS. 21, 21 (2002); Generic 
Entry Prior to Patent Expiration: An FTC Study, FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf (July, 2002). 
 11. See infra Part II. 
 12. See infra Part III. 
 13. See infra Part IV. 
 14. See infra Part V. 
 15. United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) (“Antitrust laws 
in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise.  They 
are as important to the preservation of economic freedom and our free-enterprise system as 
the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms.”).  Consumer 
welfare is the primary focus of the antitrust laws.  See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft 
Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Spanish Broad. Sys. of Fla. v. Clear Channel 
Commc’ns, Inc., 376 F.3d 1065, 1072 (11th Cir. 2004); K.M.B. Warehouse Distribs. v. 
Walker Manufacturing, 61 F.3d 123, 128 (2nd Cir. 1995).  See also Philip Areeda & Herbert 
Hovenkamp, FUNDAMENTALS OF ANTITRUST LAW § 6.04d (3rd ed. 2004). 
 16. Sherman Act of 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 
1–7 (2012)). 
 17. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).  Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits certain joint conduct 
that harms competition, providing in part: “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust 
or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or 
with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.”  Id.  Despite its broad, prohibitive terms, it 
has long been held that Section 1 only condemns “unreasonable” restraints.  Standard Oil 
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examining whether conduct is “unreasonable” for antitrust purposes, 
courts typically determine whether the challenged conduct is, on the 
whole, anticompetitive, by evaluating and balancing all anticompetitive 
effects against pro-competitive justifications.19  This inquiry, termed 
the “rule of reason” in antitrust parlance, is both flexible and fact 
specific, and usually requires an assessment of the relevant industry, 
the firms involved in the litigation, the nature of the conduct being 
challenged as unlawful, all asserted pro-competitive business 
justifications for the conduct, and the actual and likely effects of the 
conduct.20 
Monopolization may be described as exclusionary conduct, i.e., 
conduct other than competition on the merits and done for the purpose 
of obtaining or maintaining monopoly power.21  It has two elements: 
“(1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) 
Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 2 (1910).  
 18. 15 U.S.C. §  2. Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides in part: “[e]very person who 
shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person 
or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or 
with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony . . . .”  Id. 
 19. See, e.g., Bd. of Trade of the City of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 
(1918).  Specifically, the Supreme Court of the United States stated: 
[t]he true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely 
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may 
suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must 
ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is 
applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the 
restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil 
believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end 
sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. 
Id.  
 20. See WILLIAM C. HOLMES & MELISSA H. MANGIARACINA, ANTITRUST LAW 
HANDBOOK 160 (2012-2013 ed.). Because this analysis is extensive and often resource-
intensive, courts have identified circumstances when it may be truncated or even obviated.  
For example, it has long been held that certain types of conduct are so likely to have 
substantial anticompetitive effects and to have no significant procompetitive benefits that 
such conduct may be condemned outright and held to be per se illegal, i.e., without any 
assessment of its particular effects.  See, e.g., N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 
(1958) (“[T]here are certain agreements or practices which, because of their pernicious 
effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue, are conclusively presumed to be 
unreasonable, and therefore illegal, without any elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they 
have caused or the business excuse for their use.”).  Alternatively, conduct that is not 
deemed per se illegal, but nevertheless “appears likely, absent an efficiency justification, to 
restrict competition and decrease output,” may be presumed to be “unreasonable” without an 
extensive analysis— although the presumption is rebuttable upon plausible and legally 
cognizable pro-competitive justification(s).  See, e.g., Polygram Holding Inc. v. FTC, 416 
F.3d 29, 32–33 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).  This type of analysis is 
sometimes referred to as a “quick look” analysis. See, e.g., Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 
U.S. 756, 763 (1999). 
 21. E.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966). 
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the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished 
from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, 
business acumen, or historic accident.”22  Civil remedies for an 
antitrust violation may include an injunction,23 restitution,24 
disgorgement,25 and treble damages.26 
Filing frivolous lawsuits has the potential to be anticompetitive 
regardless of whether done to protects a firm’s market power or as a 
joint strategy among firms to impede competition.  Litigation is often 
costly, and thus if meritless, may thwart or undermine competition.27  
For example, baseless litigation filed by a dominant firm against a 
competitor may deter suppliers and/or purchasers from dealing with the 
competitor due to anxiety over provoking litigation or disfavored 
treatment by the dominant firm.  And even a company without any 
apprehension about retaliation from the dominant firm may nonetheless 
decline to do business with the competitor so as to avoid any legal 
uncertainties (such as may be the case when the competitor’s product is 
alleged to be infringing a patent). 
Although antitrust is primarily concerned with the protection of 
competition, it recognizes that in certain, limited circumstances, 
competition concerns may have to defer to other policy goals.28  As a 
result, certain conduct has been granted immunity from antitrust 
liability, regardless of the extent of anticompetitive effects.29  For 
example, two of the most commonly known of these immunities are the 
statutory exemption relating to certain acts by organized labor,30 and 
the exemption applying to professional baseball.31  More relevant is the 
 22. Id. 
 23. 15 U.S.C. § 26. 
 24. See, e.g., United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 171–72 (1948). 
 25. See id. 
 26. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a).   
 27. So long as the baseless litigation impedes or even interferes with the competitive 
process, there is an argument that it may be anticompetitive, regardless of whether it result is 
any measure anticompetitive effects.  
 28. See, e.g., United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 229–31. 
 29. See id. 
 30. See Norris-La Guardia Act of 1932, ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70–73 (codified as amended at 
29 U.S.C. §§ 101–110) (2012). The purpose of the statute was discussed by the Supreme 
Court in Hutcheson:  
The Norris-LaGuardia Act reasserted the original purpose of the Clayton Act by 
infusing into it the immunized trade union activities as redefined by the later Act. 
In this light [section] 20 removes all such allowable conduct from the taint of 
being a ‘violation of any law of the United States’, including the Sherman Law. 
Hutcheson, 312 U.S. at 236. 
 31. See Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953) (“Congress had no 
intention of including the business of baseball within the scope of the federal antitrust 
laws.”); Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 284 (1972) (upholding the Toolson decision). 
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Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which is based on constitutional principles 
supporting the right to petition the government, and provides that 
“[t]hose who petition government for redress are generally immune 
from antitrust liability.”32  Courts have interpreted Noerr-Pennington 
immunity to include the filing of litigation for the purpose of 
vindicating legal rights.33 Noerr-Pennington immunity thus 
subordinates antitrust’s concerns that litigation may be used as an 
anticompetitive weapon,34 in favor of broadly permitting the 
enforcement of legal rights via litigation. 
Antitrust immunity granted by Noerr-Pennington is not without 
limits, however.  Rather, antitrust attempts to deal with the tension 
caused by allowing bona fide litigation and yet still curbing abusing, 
anticompetitive lawsuits by denying any immunity to frivolous 
litigation.  Accordingly, antitrust immunity is not granted to litigation 
that is a mere “sham,” i.e., “encompass[ing] situations in which [a] 
person use[s] the government process—as opposed to the outcome of 
that process—as an anticompetitive weapon.”35  Litigation that is both 
objectively baseless “in the sense that no reasonable litigant could 
realistically expect success on the merits,” and is subjectively 
improper, i.e., “conceals ‘an attempt to interfere directly with the 
business relationships of a competitor,’” is thus not afforded antitrust 
 32. Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures, Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 56 
(1993).  The so-called Noerr-Pennington doctrine is the result of two Supreme Court cases:  
E. R.R. President’s Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127 (1965) and United 
Mine workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).  In Noerr, the Court held that 
concerted efforts to seek legislative relief were immune from antitrust liability, even though 
they may be anticompetitive. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 136.  In Pennington, concerted petitioning 
efforts by mineworkers and mines seeking higher minimum wages for companies selling 
coal to a federal agency were held to be immune. Pennington, 381 U.S. at 661. 
 33. See, e.g., Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510–11 
(1972) (holding that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine did not apply where defendants had 
sought to intervene in licensing proceedings for competitors because the intervention was 
done to harass competitors). 
 34. An example of an area where much concern has been raised about potentially 
anticompetitive litigation is litigation by “patent trolls,” entities that acquire patents for the 
sole purpose of monetizing them via litigation or licensing rather than using them to 
innovate. See, e.g., Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives 
and Evidence in the Litigation of High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1571, 1573–74 
(2009); Robin M. Davis, Failed Attempts to Dwarf the Patent Trolls: Permanent Injunctions 
in Patent Infringement Cases Under the Proposed Patent Reform Act of 2005 and Ebay v. 
Mercexchange, 17 CORNELL J.L & PUB. POL’Y 431, 431–32 (2008); J.P. Mello, 
Technology Licensing and Patent Trolls, 12 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 388,  
388 (2006); Joe Beyers, Perspective: Rise of the Patent Trolls, CNET NEWS  
(Oct. 12, 2005), http://news.cnet.com/rise+of+the+patent+trolls/2010-1071_3-
5892996.html. 
 35. City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., 499 U.S. 365, 380 (1991). 
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immunity.36  However, proving that litigation is a “sham” under Noerr-
Pennington merely strips a litigant of antitrust immunity; it does not 
impose liability by itself.37  Rather, “even a plaintiff who defeats the 
defendant’s claim to Noerr immunity by demonstrating both the 
objective and subjective components of a sham must still prove a 
substantive antitrust violation.”38 
B. The Hatch-Waxman Act 
The high and rising cost of health care in the United States is an 
issue of national importance and concern.  It is estimated that in 2010, 
total health care expenditures accounted for nearly eighteen percent of 
gross domestic product.39  And pharmaceuticals continue to be a 
significant portion of that cost, estimated at over $263 billion in 2012.40 
In the United States, the sale of pharmaceuticals is heavily 
regulated.  The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act (“Act”) and its 
implementing regulations govern, inter alia, the manufacturing, sale 
and marketing of pharmaceuticals in the United States.41  Under the 
Act, anyone seeking to bring a new drug to market must submit a New 
Drug Application (“NDA”) with the Food and Drug Administration 
(“FDA”) and provide scientific data demonstrating that the drug is safe 
and effective for its intended use.42  A company filing an NDA must 
also provide FDA with information on all composition or method 
patents that it claims covers the drug for which it seeks approval and 
“with respect to which a claim of patent infringement could reasonably 
 36. Prof’l Real Estate Investors 508 U.S. at 60–61 (quoting Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144).  A 
similar type of antitrust claim is enforcement of a fraudulent procured patent.  See, e.g., 
Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 174 (1965) (“The 
enforcement of a patent procured by fraud on the Patent Office may be violative of §2 of the 
Sherman Act provided the other elements necessary to a §2 case are present.”).  Sham 
litigation and Walker-Process claims are similar, but distinct legal theories.  Nobelpharma 
AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1071 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“PRE and Walker 
Process provide alternative legal grounds on which a patentee may be stripped of its 
immunity from the antitrust laws; both legal theories may be applied to the same conduct.”). 
 37. Prof’l Real Estate Investors, 508 U.S. at 61. 
 38. Id. 
 39. THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., HEALTH CARE COSTS: A PRIMER 1 (May 
2012), available at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/ 
2013/01/7670-03.pdf 
 40. See National Health Expenditure 2012 Highlights, CTR. FOR MEDICARE & 
MEDICAID SERVS., http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-
Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/Downloads 
/highlights.pdf.. 
 41. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C §§ 351–360eee4 (2012). 
 42. 21 U.S.C § 355(b)(1); See also Caraco Pharm. Laboratories v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 
132 S. Ct. 1670, 1676 (2012). 
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be asserted.”43  FDA may approve an NDA for one or multiple uses.44  
Once an NDA is approved, FDA lists the drug, along with information 
about the applicable patents, in its publication “Approved Drug 
Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations,” commonly 
referred to as the “Orange Book.”45 
In 1984, Congress enacted the Drug Price Competition and Patent 
Term Restoration Act,46 commonly referred to as the Hatch-Waxman 
Act, amending the Act to encourage generic entry by permitting a 
quicker, easier means for generic drugs to come to market.47  Under the 
Hatch-Waxman Act, companies seeking to market generic versions of a 
drug that has already been approved pursuant to an NDA may obtain 
FDA approval by filing an Abbreviated New Drug Application 
(ANDA), and demonstrating that their generic version is 
“bioequivalent” to the drug approved under the  NDA.48  Approval of 
an ANDA is limited to the same uses approved for the NDA, and is 
contingent upon compliance with additional substantive and procedural 
requirements, including having to evaluate whether its proposed 
generic would infringe upon any patent(s) listed in the Orange Book as 
covering the NDA.49  Specifically, the ANDA filer must certify one of 
the following:  (I) no patent information is listed in the Orange Book 
for the drug approved by the NDA; (II) the listed patent(s) have 
expired; (III)  the listed patents will expire before the generic product is 
marketed; or (IV)  the patents listed are invalid or will not be infringed 
by the generic.50  When a generic company challenges a patent’s 
validity or asserts non-infringement—referred to as a “paragraph IV 
 43. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(G). 
 44. Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1676. 
 45. Id.  See also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., ORANGE BOOK: APPROVED DRUG 
PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS (Feb. 2014), available at 
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/default.cfm. 
 46. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 
Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. § 301 (1984)). 
 47. E.g., In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 204 (3d Cir. 2012) (“Congress 
explained that the purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act is ‘to make available more low cost 
generic drugs.’”) (citation omitted); Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 
552 F.3d 1033, 1036 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term 
Restoration Act of 1984, commonly referred to as the ‘Hatch-Waxman Act’ or ‘Hatch-
Waxman,’ was passed to facilitate the approval of generic versions of brand-name drugs.”).   
 48. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A).  A generic is “bioequivalent” to a branded drug when 
“the rate and extent of absorption of the generic drug is not significantly different from the 
rate and extent of absorption of the branded drug, when administered at the same dosage. Id. 
§ 355(i)(8)(B).   
 49. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii); see also Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1676 (“Because the FDA 
cannot authorize a generic drug that would infringe a patent, the timing of an ANDA’s 
approval depends on the scope and duration of the patents covering the brand-name drug.”). 
 50. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I)–(IV).   
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certification”—it must also set forth “a detailed statement of the factual 
and legal basis for the applicant’s opinion that the patent is not valid or 
will not be infringed.”51  A limited exception to this requirement is 
when the ANDA seeks approval for a drug use that is not covered by 
any patent listed in the Orange Book.52  Under those circumstances, the 
generic may instead provide a statement asserting that its ANDA does 
not seek approval for any use claimed by any Orange Book patent (i.e., 
it seeks to market the drugs only for approved but unpatented uses).53 
The Hatch-Waxman Act creates a unique method for branded and 
generic drug manufacturers to resolve patent issue.  Rather than 
requiring a generic drug manufacturer to first create and distribute a 
potentially infringing product (the usual prerequisite to infringement 
litigation), the Act allows patent litigation to go forward prior to the 
sale and even FDA approval of a generic product.54  Thus, the Act 
provides that the mere filing of a paragraph IV certification is an 
“artificial act of infringement,” permitting the holder of the NDA to file 
an infringement action against the generic manufacturer—even though 
no infringing product is on the market (as FDA has not yet approved 
the ANDA).55  Thereafter, if the NDA holder initiates patent litigation 
 51. Id. § 355(b)(3)(D)(ii). 
 52. See Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1681–82.  See also Warner Lambert v. Apotex, 316 F.3d 
1348, 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Bayer Schering Pharma v. Lupin, 676 F.3d 1316 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012)(no infringement when a generic drug manufacturer’s ANDA only seeks FDA 
approval to market its drug for unpatented uses).. 
 53. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii).  In such cases, the generic must submit a proposed 
label that “carves out” the NDA’s method patent.  E.g., Caraco, 132 S. Ct.  at 1682;  Bayer 
Schering Pharma AG v. Lupin, Ltd., 676 F.3d 1316, 1318–19 (Fed. Cir. 2012); AstraZeneca 
Pharms. LP v. Apotex Corp., 669 F.3d 1370, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“Where the Orange 
Book lists a method of use patent that ‘does not claim a use for which the applicant is 
seeking approval,’ an applicant may instead submit a statement under 21 U.S.C. § 
355(j)(2)(A)(viii) averring that the ANDA excludes all uses claimed in the patent.”) (citation 
omitted).  Thus, “a patented method of using a drug can only be infringed under [section] 
271(e)(2) by filing an ANDA that seeks approval to market the drug for that use.” 
AstraZeneca, 669 F.3d at 1379 (citing Warner–Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., 316 F.3d 
1348, 1358–59 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). Thus, an ANDA seeking to market a drug not covered by a 
composition patent for unpatented methods of treatment cannot infringe under section 
271(e)(2).  Id. at 1354–55 (“[W]e conclude that it is not an act of infringement to submit an 
ANDA for approval to market a drug for a use when neither the drug nor that use is covered 
by an existing patent, and the  patent at issue is for a use not approved under the NDA.”). 
 54. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(D). 
 55. Eli Lilly and Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 678 (1990). See also In re 
Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litig., Nos. 08–2431 (direct), 08–2433 (indirect), 2012 WL 
1657734, at *9 (E.D. Pa. May 11, 2012) (“An infringement inquiry triggered by an ANDA 
filing is focused on the product that is likely to be sold following FDA approval. Because 
the potentially infringing drug has not yet been marketed when the patent holder files suit, 
the inquiry is a hypothetical one that asks the fact finder to determine whether the drug that 
will be sold upon approval of the ANDA will infringe the asserted patent.”) (citing Bayer 
AG, 212 F.3d at 1248–49). 
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against a company which submitted a paragraph IV certification, FDA 
approval of that generic company’s ANDA is automatically delayed for 
thirty months or until the patent is held to be invalid or not infringed.56  
In contrast, if the NDA holder does not file suit within 45 days, FDA 
may approve the ANDA immediately, provided that all other 
conditions for approval have been met, i.e., the drug is deemed safe and 
efficacious.57  By this means, the Act creates a way for the generic and 
branded drug manufacturers to work out patent disputes prior to the 
generic incurring the cost of entry and production (as well as avoiding 
damages for infringement). 
C. Patent Law 
Whoever invents a useful, novel, and non-obvious process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter may obtain a patent on 
that invention.58  A patent grants its holder (the “patentee”) the “right 
to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the 
invention.”59  One who makes, uses or sells a product covered by a 
patent without a patentee’s authorization is said to have infringed the 
patent.60 
Patents are issued by the United States Patent & Trademark 
Office.61  A patent document contains various sections.62  Of 
particularly importance is the patents’ “specification” and its 
“claims.”63  The specification contains a “written description of the 
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in 
such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled 
in the art to which it pertains” to make or use the invention.64  Each 
patent has at least one claim, in which the inventor must “explicitly 
identify[y] the subject matter of the invention and particularly poin[t] 
out and distinctly clai[m] the subject matter” of the invention.65  “The 
 56. Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 677–78. 
 57. Id. at 677; 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(C).  See also Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc. v. 
Abbott Labs., Inc., 552 F.3d 1033, 1037 (9th Cir. 2009) (“If a patent holder fails to bring an 
infringement action within forty-five days of receipt of a Paragraph IV notification, it loses 
the right to the thirty-month automatic stay 
 . . .”). 
 58. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103 (2012). 
 59. Id. § 154(a)(1).   
 60. Id. § 271(a).   
 61. Id. § 153.   
 62. Id. § 154(a)(1).   
 63. Id. § 112. 
 64. Id. § 112(a). 
 65. Id. § 112(b).  
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claim ‘define[s] the scope of a patent grant’” 66 by identifying the 
“metes and bounds of the claimed invention.”67 
A patentee may file suit for infringement against one who makes, 
sells or uses the patented invention.68  “Victory in an infringement suit 
requires a finding that the patent claim ‘covers the alleged infringer’s 
product or process,’ which in turn necessitates a determination of ‘what 
the words in the claim mean.’” 69  The process of analyzing whether 
there has been patent infringement typically requires two steps.  First, a 
court must construe or interpret the meaning of the claims.70  While 
this starts with evaluating the claims themselves, the court may also 
look to a patents’ specification to the extent it assists in interpreting the 
meaning of claims.71  Second, the court will compare defendant’s 
product or method to the patent and conclude whether there is an 
infringement (i.e., that there is a match, in layman’s terms).72  
Successfully proving infringement will afford the patentee the right to 
seek damages73 and an injunction.74  A finding of infringement does 
not necessarily guarantee victory for the patentee, however.  A 
defendant may also attack the validity of the patent,75 i.e., there is no 
liability for infringing an invalid patent. 
D. Liability for Frivolous Lawsuits 
Antitrust is not the only means by which the law attempts to curb 
frivolous litigation.  Indeed, one may question why antitrust—which 
focuses on competition—is needed for such a task (or even 
appropriate).  However, as maintained infra, antitrust liability is 
necessary in certain situations where other means of deterring frivolous 
litigation are likely to be insufficient—such as where frivolous 
 66. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 373 (1996). 
 67. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINATION 
PROCEDURE (MPEP) §§ 2173, 2173.05(a), (Sept. 2012), available at , 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s2173.html. 
 68. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). 
 69. Markman, 517 U.S. at 374 (citations omitted).   
 70. Id. at 373. 
 71. Philips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“The claims, of 
course, do not stand alone. Rather, they are part of ‘a fully integrated written instrument,’  
consisting principally of a specification that concludes with the claims. For that reason, 
claims ‘must be read in view of the specification, of which they are a part.’ As we stated in 
Vitronics, the specification ‘is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. 
Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.’”) 
(citations omitted). 
 72. IMS Tech., Inc. v. Haas Automation, Inc., 206 F.3d 1422, 1429 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 73. 35 U.S.C. § 284. 
 74. Id. § 283. 
 75. Id. §§ 101–103 (requirements for patent validity).   
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litigation is likely to impede competition and the potential gains far 
exceed any penalty, cost, or fine imposed. 
Various statutes and ethical rules attempt to deter frivolous 
litigation.  For example, under the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct, an attorney is not to file an action “unless there is a basis in 
law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good 
faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing 
law.”76  Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
(“Rule 11”), an attorney filing an action in federal court must attest that 
the action is “not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to 
harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of 
litigation,” and that all claims are “nonfrivolous.”77  Litigation done for 
the purpose of causing delay has been found to be an “improper 
purpose” under Rule 11.78 
Rule 11 not only prohibits affirmative misconduct, e.g., filing an 
action with an improper purpose, but also mandates a minimal amount 
of due diligence prior to initiating litigation.79  Thus, pursuant to Rule 
11, an attorney is required “to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the law 
and facts before filing a pleading in a court.”80  In the context of patent 
infringement actions, the due diligence requirement of Rule 11 
mandates, “at a minimum, that an attorney interpret the asserted patent 
claims and compare the accused device with those claims before filing 
a claim alleging infringement.”81  Moreover, an attorney must “certify 
that the claims contained therein are not frivolous, legally 
unreasonable, without factual foundation, or asserted for an improper 
 76. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (1983).  See also RESTATEMENT OF 
THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 110, 170 (2000).  
 77. FED R. CIV. P. 11(b). Another potential basis for awarding fees for frivolous 
lawsuits may be 28 U.S.C. §1927, a fee shifting statute titled “Counsel’s Liability for 
Excessive Costs.”  Furthermore, fees or sanctions could be imposed under a court’s inherent 
power to control litigation.  E.g., Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 33 (1991); 
Autorama Corp. v. Stewart, 802 F.2d 1284, 1287–88 (10th Cir. 1986); Adams v. Carlson, 
521 F.2d 168, 170 (7th Cir. 1975).  However, each of these grounds has substantial 
limitations that make them unlikely deterrents. 
 78. See, e.g., Wright v. Tackett, 39 F.3d 155, 158 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding improper 
purpose where plaintiff filed lawsuit just to delay foreclosure proceedings); Pathe Computer 
Control Sys. Corp. v. Kinmont Indus., Inc., 955 F.2d 94, 97 (1st Cir. 1992) (finding timing 
of motion to transfer indicated a last minute effort to delay a likely adverse decision on the 
merits); INVST Fin. Group v. Chem-Nuclear Sys., Inc., 815 F.2d 391, 402 (6th Cir. 1987); 
Davis v. Veslan Enters., 765 F.2d 494, 500 (5th Cir. 1985); In re Oximetrix, Inc., 748 F.2d 
637, 644 (Fed. Cir. 1984) 
 79. See Q-Pharma, Inc. v. The Andrews Jergens Co., 360 F.3d 1295, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 
2004). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 1300–01. 
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purpose.”82  However, Rule 11 is not likely to deter maintaining a 
frivolous action because courts have generally not interpreted the rule 
to proscribe “continuing a nonmeritorious lawsuit.”83 
Patent law also attempts to deter frivolous litigation by granting 
courts the authority to award fees incurred in defending such actions.  
Pursuant to Section 285 of the Patent Act (“Section 285”), a court may 
award reasonable attorney’s fees in “exceptional”84 cases, i.e., those 
involving bad faith, frivolous suits, vexations litigation, or other types 
of misconduct effectuated in either litigation or in securing a patent.85  
Patent infringement litigation that is both objectively baseless and 
made in bad faith may be deemed “exceptional”86 and thereby subject 
 82. Id. at 1300.  See also Judin v. United States, 110 F.3d 780, 784–85 (Fed. Cir. 1997) 
(finding a Rule 11 violation where neither patentee nor counsel put forth reasonable pre-
litigation effort to assess whether there was infringement, including attempting to obtain the 
alleged infringing product). 
 83. See, e.g., Hilton Hotels Corp. v. Banov, 899 F.2d 40, 44–45 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (citing 
cases and holding that “Rule 11’s emphasis on the need to perform a ‘reasonable inquiry’ 
before ‘sign[ing]’ a ‘pleading, motion, or other paper’ suggests that the rule authorizes 
sanctioning an attorney only for unreasonably filing such a submission, not for failing to 
withdraw or to amend the submission when postfiling contingencies reveal it to be 
unfounded) (citation omitted); Julia K. Cowles, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure and the Duty to Withdraw a Baseless Pleading, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 697, 704–
05 (1988).  Cf. Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., 687 F.3d 1300, 1309 n.1 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012) (“[T]he inquiries under Rule 11 and EAJA [the Equal Access to Justice Act] look 
to the situation existing at the time a particular claim or representation was made, analyzing 
only the facts and law present at that time [sic] determine whether the claim or 
representation was justified.”). But see G. Wayne Merchant, II, At What Point Does an 
Attorney Have A Duty to Dismiss a Lawsuit That May be a Meritless Claim?, 27 J. LEGAL 
PROF. 233, 235 (2003) (discussing cases wherein attorneys were sanctioned under Rule 11 
because they continued with lawsuits they knew to be frivolous). 
 84. 35 U.S.C. § 285. 
 85. E.g., Highmark, 687 F.3d at 1315–16, cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 48 (Oct. 1, 2013) 
(“‘Litigation misconduct generally involves unethical or unprofessional conduct by a party 
or his attorneys during the course of adjudicative proceedings,’ and includes advancing 
frivolous arguments during the course of the litigation or otherwise prolonging litigation in 
bad faith.”) (citation omitted); Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. LKB Produkter AB, 892 F.2d 
1547, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“Among the types of conduct which can form a basis for 
finding a case exceptional are willful infringement, inequitable conduct before the P.T.O., 
misconduct during litigation, vexatious or unjustified litigation, and frivolous suit.”) 
(citation omitted).  The Supreme Court’ review of Highmark is limited to the issue of what 
is the appropriate level of deference on appeal of a district court’s findings that a case is 
“exceptional.”  See Brief for Petitioner at i, Highmark, 134 S. Ct. 48 (Oct. 1, 2013) (No. 12-
1163), available at http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/No-12-
Highmark-Cert-PetAppendix-Final.pdf. 
 86. E.g., Highmark, 687 F.3d at 1308; Brooks Furniture Mfg. v. Dutailier Int’l, Inc., 
393 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Phonometrics, Inc. v. Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc., 65 
Fed Appx. 284, 285 (Fed. Cir. 2003).  The appropriateness of the Federal’s Circuit’s 
standard for deciding when a case is “exceptional” is on appeal and will be decided this term 
by the Supreme Court.  In Icon Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Octane Fitness, Inc., 496 Fed. 
Appx. 57 (Fed. Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 134 S.Ct. 49 (Oct. 1, 2013), the Supreme Court 
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to an award of fees under Section 285. 
While antitrust may not be the only means of deterring frivolous 
litigation, remedies for an antitrust violation—such as treble 
damages—may be quite substantial and thus more likely to deter such 
conduct, in contrast to violations of Rule 11 and Section 285 which 
only result in fee shifting and/or sanctions.  Indeed, in markets where a 
monopolist may reap considerable profits by impeding competition—
such as in pharmaceuticals—antitrust may play a significant role in 
preventing frivolous litigation. 
III. HATCH-WAXMAN CASES INVOLVING OBJECTIVELY BASELESS 
INFRINGEMENT 
This section examines Hatch-Waxman litigation between a 
branded drug manufacturer with an approved NDA and one or more 
generic drug manufacturers that have filed an ANDA and have been 
sued for patent infringement.  In each of these cases, the ANDA holder 
asserts that the infringement allegations are a sham and done solely to 
delay generic entry.  The cases demonstrate that although the reasons 
why Hatch-Waxman litigation may be (or become) objectively baseless 
may vary, e.g., from a lack of effort in assessing infringement, to clear 
evidence of non-infringement, to evidence of bad faith and improper 
motive, such litigation has the potential to be anticompetitive by 
delaying generic competition. 
Part A evaluates cases challenging an NDA’s patent infringement 
allegations via antitrust sham litigation claims (or counterclaims), 
while Part B reviews cases contesting infringement assertions under 
Rule 11 and/or Section 285.  Although sham litigation claims (or 
counterclaims) are not uncommon in Hatch-Waxman cases, they are 
often based on patents alleged to be invalid and/or unenforceable.87  In 
will review the Federal Circuit’s existing standard for determining whether conduct is 
“exceptional.”  While the Petitioner argues that the Federal Circuit’s standard is not 
supported by the text of the statute and is contrary to its purpose, see Brief for Petitioner at 
10, Icon Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Octane Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 49 (Oct. 1, 2013) (No. 12-
1184), even if the Supreme Court agrees and applies a more flexible and easier standard for 
finding a case as “exceptional,” it will have a limited deterrent effect on filing and 
maintaining frivolous litigation since the statute only grants attorney’s fees for “exceptional” 
cases.  
 87. See, e.g., In re DDAVP Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 585 F.3d 677 (2d Cir. 
2009); Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc. v. Abbott Labs, Inc., 552 F.3d 1033 (9th Cir. 2009); 
Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 174 (1965) 
(“[T]he enforcement of a patent procured by fraud on the Patent Office may be violative of § 
2 of the Sherman Act provided the other elements necessary to a § 2 case are present.”).  
Similarly, litigation to enforce a patent known to be invalid may also violate the antitrust 
laws.  For example, in Handsguard, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., the court upheld a jury verdict 
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contrast, this article focuses on cases where sham litigation is 
predicated on baseless infringement assertions.88  The article does not 
purport to be an exhaustive review of all such cases, but rather, 
evaluates cases considered to be illustrative of the types of situations 
where maintaining baseless litigation may be anticompetitive.  And 
while the cases discussed assert that the action was a sham at the time 
the case was filed, as discussed infra Part IVA, this is a distinction 
without a difference.  That is, there are similar anticompetitive 
concerns with maintaining baseless litigation as with filing such 
litigation, and no reason to treat such actions differently. 
A. Antitrust Sham Litigation Cases Predicated on Baseless 
Infringement 
The following are three Hatch-Waxman cases where antitrust 
claims (or counterclaims) were based on allegations that the underlying 
infringement actions were baseless.  While the cases arise in different 
factual and procedural contexts, in each case the court agreed that the 
allegations or facts asserted plausibly supported a finding that the NDA 
holder’s infringement litigation was a sham. 
Sham litigation claims (or counterclaims) made in the Hatch-
Waxman context must satisfy the same elements as all sham litigation 
claims.  Thus, while Hatch-Waxman litigation certainly has its unique 
features, to succeed on a claim of antitrust sham litigation requires 
both:  (a) demonstrating that the litigation is a sham and thereby not 
granted antitrust immunity under Noerr-Pennington; and (b) proving a 
substantive antitrust violation. 
Recall that the filing of litigation to vindicate legal rights is 
typically afforded antitrust immunity.  However, sham litigation that is 
both objectively baseless “in the sense that no reasonable litigant could 
realistically expect success on the merits,” and is subjectively 
improper, i.e., “conceals ‘an attempt to interfere directly with the 
business relationships of a competitor,’” 89 is not granted immunity.  
And while proving that litigation is a sham is often a formidable task, it 
certainly is not impossible.  Indeed, it is worth emphasizing that courts 
have largely rejected efforts to immunize Hatch-Waxman litigation 
imposing antitrust liability for initiation and maintenance of an infringement action despite 
knowing that the patent was invalid.  743 F.2d 1282 at 1300 (9th Cir. 1984). 
 88. In a few of the cases discussed, sham litigation claims were predicated on both 
unenforceability of the patent as well as baseless infringement.  See, e.g., Nabi 
Biopharmaceuticals v. Roxane Labs, Inc., No. 2:05-CV-889, 2007 WL 894473 (S.D. Ohio 
Mar. 21, 2007). 
 89. Prof’l Real Estate Invs. v. Columbia Pictures, 508 U.S. 49, 60–61 (1993).   
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from antitrust liability due to certain features of its regulatory context.  
Thus, while a few courts have suggested that the filing of Hatch-
Waxman litigation should be presumptively reasonable (and thus not a 
sham) due to the limited forty-five day period provided to branded drug 
manufactures to file suit in order to stay FDA approval of the generic 
for thirty months, these decisions have largely not been followed.90 
1. PhosLo 
Nabi Biopharmaceuticals v. Roxane Labs91 was a suit involving 
PhosLo, a branded drug marketed by Nabi and approved by FDA to 
treat hyperphosphatemia, a condition causing the body to retain high 
levels of phosphate.92  Nabi listed three patents for PhosLo in the 
Orange Book, including 6,576,665 (‘665) which claimed a calcium 
acetate capsule with a bulk density of between 0.50 kg/L and 0.80 kg/
 90. For example, In AstraZeneca AB v. Mylan Labs, Inc., Nos. 00 Civ. 6749, 03 Civ. 
6057, 2010 WL 2079722 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 2010), a Hatch-Waxman case involving 
omeprazole, the court suggested that patent litigation by a branded company would likely 
always be objectively reasonable and thereby not a sham:  
[A]t the outset of Astra’s case, Mylan gave Astra an objectively reasonable basis 
to sue: Mylan provided Astra notice of its Paragraph IV certification. This is an 
act of infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A).   The Court agrees with Astra 
that a reasonable plaintiff in a Hatch-Waxman case would be expected to know 
few details about the accused product at the outset of litigation and plaintiff’s 
counsel may reasonably rely on discovery to learn the material details. 
Id. at *4 (citation omitted).  However, as discussed infra, another judge in the same court 
came out with a very different conclusion in similar omeprazole patent litigation against a 
different generic manufacturer.  AstraZeneca AB v. Dr. Reddy’s Labs, Ltd., No. 07 Civ. 
6790(CM), 2010 WL 1375176 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2010).  Similarly, in Celegene Corp. v. 
KV Pharms. Co., No. 07–4819 (SDW), 2008 WL 2856469 (D.N.J. July 22, 2008), a Hatch-
Waxman litigation involving methylphenidate (an ADHD drug), the court suggested that 
filing infringement might always be objectively reasonably: 
Because the Act has made the act of submitting an ANDA itself an act of 
infringement, in a Hatch–Waxman ANDA case, the attorney can conduct a 
reasonable and competent inquiry into the act of infringement by investigating 
whether a relevant ANDA has been filed.  In the instant case, the Notice Letter 
provided sufficient basis for an attorney to reasonably believe that a relevant 
ANDA had been filed, and thus that an actionable act of infringement had 
occurred.  Because submitting the ANDA itself is an act of infringement, and is 
therefore actionable, and because Celgene’s Complaint predicates both of its 
two counts on that act of infringement, Celgene and its attorneys had no pre-
filing obligation to investigate whether KV’s methylphenidate drug actually 
infringed Celgene’s patents.  Because there is no dispute that KV submitted an 
ANDA which constitutes an act of infringement, and because KV states that, 
prior to filing suit, Celgene had received the Notice Letter which gave notice of 
the ANDA submission, this Court concludes that Celgene’s prefiling 
infringement investigation was reasonable under the circumstances.  
Id. at *3.  These cases, however, have largely not been followed.   
 91. 2007 WL 894473. 
 92. Id. at *7. 
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L.93  After Roxane filed an ANDA for generic PhosLo and submitted a 
paragraph IV certification on the ‘665 patent, Nabi sued Roxane for 
patent infringement.94 
In response to the infringement suit, Roxane filed a 
monopolization counterclaim alleging antitrust sham litigation 
predicated on baseless infringement claims as well as an unenforceable 
patent.95  According to Roxane, Nabi’s conduct in filing and 
“contin[uing] to maintain the current action” was objectively baseless 
because, prior to the litigation, Roxane provided Nabi with “clear 
evidence” that its generic did not infringe Nabi’s patents.96  
Specifically, Roxane contended that prior to the litigation, it provided 
samples of its generic to Nabi that unequivocally demonstrated non-
infringement.97  Moreover, as evidence of bad faith, Roxane 
highlighted Nabi’s refusal to provide Roxane with the results of any of 
its analysis of Roxane’s samples.98  And while Nabi filed a motion to 
dismiss Roxane’s monopolization counterclaim, the court denied the 
motion, concluding that Roxane’s allegations, if true, were sufficient to 
support an antitrust claim.99 
2. Neurontin 
In re Neurontin Antitrust Litigation100 concerned gabapentin, an 
anti-epilepsy drug marketed by Warner-Lambert as Neurontin.101  
Warner-Lambert claimed patents on the drug as well as on various uses 
and processes involving the drug.102  Several generic manufacturers 
 93. Id. at *1. 
 94. Id. at *3. 
 95. Id. at *1–2.  The court also held that Nabi made sufficient factual assertions to 
supports its claims that the patent was unenforceable due to fraud on the patent office and 
that enforcement of such patent could state an antitrust claim.  Id. at *4– 5.   
 96. Id. at *1, *3. 
 97. Id. at *3. According to Roxane, the information it provided to Nabi prior to 
litigation “demonstrated that Roxane’s proposed calcium acetate capsules are made from 
calcium acetate with a bulk density outside of the range claimed in the 665 patent and 
utilizing untabletted powder within a capsule, not compressed into a caplet as required by 
the claims of the 665 patent.”  Id.  
 98. Id. at *4. 
 99. Id. at *4 (“[B]ecause [the] counterclaims allege that the lawsuit filed . . . is 
objectively baseless and conceals an attempt to interfere directly with the business 
relationships of a competitor, the counterclaims adequately state a claim and should not be 
dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).”). 
 100. Nos. 02-1830 (FSH), 02-2731 (FSH), 02-5583 (FSH), 2009 WL 2751029 (D.N.J. 
Auguest 28, 2009). 
 101. Id. at *2.  Although the drug has been approved by the FDA for epilepsy since 
1993, its primary use was off-label for various neurodegenerative conditions, such as 
Parkinsons, ALS.  Id.  
 102. Id. at *1.  For example, patent 4,894,476 (‘476) claimed gabapentin monohydrate; 
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filed ANDAs with paragraph IV certifications, and Warner-Lambert 
promptly commenced patent litigation against all of them.103  In 2003, 
after several years of litigation, summary judgment of non-
infringement was granted on the most relevant patents.104 
Not long after the summary judgment decision, antitrust litigation 
was commenced by direct purchasers of Neurontin.105  The direct 
purchasers alleged, inter alia, that Warner-Lambert’s patent litigation 
was a sham and part of an “overall scheme to monopolize the market 
for gabapentin anhydrous products by forestalling, if not completely 
preventing, generic competition.”106  In particular, several of the 
infringement actions were challenged as being objectively baseless and 
made in bad faith.107   
Warner-Lambert filed a motion to dismiss, contending that its 
infringement actions were immune under Noerr-Pennington,108 and 
that plaintiffs failed to plead sufficient facts to support a 
monopolization claim.109  The court disagreed and denied the 
motion.110  First, the court rejected Warner-Lambert’s immunity 
argument, noting that sham litigation is a well-recognized exception to 
Noerr-Pennington immunity.111  Second, the court held that the 
patent 5,084, 479 (‘479) claimed the use of gabapentin anhydrous to treat neurodegenerative 
diseases, and 6,054,482 (‘482) claimed a process for developing low-lactum gabapentin.  Id. 
 103. Id. at *2. 
 104. Id. at *3.  For one of the patents, Warner-Lambert did not even oppose summary 
judgment, effectively conceding non-infringement.  Id. at *6 n.20.    
 105. See id. *3. 
 106. Id. at *4.  The overall scheme included:  
(1) procuring two additional patents that it improperly listed in the Orange Book; 
(2) manipulating the patent approval process so that a third patent with claims so 
limited that they are impossible to accurately measure or distinguish from the prior 
art so that the patent could be used to delay generic entry; (3) filing and 
prosecuting multiple sham lawsuits on these patents that no reasonable litigant 
could have expected to succeed; and (4) engaging in fraudulent off-label 
promotion to convince doctors to prescribe Neurontin for uses for which it was not 
approved.  
Id.  
 107. Id. at *6.  Specifically, it was alleged that: (i) the ‘476 patent litigation was baseless 
because the generics sought approval for a gabapentin anhydrous formulation rather than the 
patented gabapentin monohydrate formulation; (ii) the lawsuits on the ‘479 patent were 
baseless because the generics were not seeking approval for the use claimed by that patent (a 
use which was not approved by FDA); and (iii) the ‘482 patent litigation was baseless 
because the patent’s claims “are formulated so narrowly, it is not possible to determine 
whether generic products would actually infringe the patent.” Id. at.  Accord In re 
Gabapentin Patent Litig., 649 F. Supp. 2d 340, 361–64 (D.N.J. 2009) (discussing plaintiff’s 
allegation of baseless patent litigation based on Gabapentin drug). 
 108. See supra Part II.A. 
 109. Neurontin, 2009 WL 2751029, at *21–22.   
 110. Id. at *23. 
 111. Id. at *21 (“Warner-Lambert correctly argues that litigation to enforce its rights 
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plaintiffs alleged sufficient facts to support their antitrust claims.112 
3. Wellbutrin XL 
Most recently, the court in In re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust 
Litigation113 addressed antitrust sham litigation in a summary judgment 
context.  Wellbutrin XL involved Hatch-Waxman litigation for a 
controlled release formulation for the antidepressant bupropion 
hydrochloride, which is marketed by Biovail as Wellbutrin XL.114  
Biovail listed two patents for the controlled release formula: 6,096,341 
(‘341) and 6,143, 327 (‘327).115  Four generic manufacturers filed 
ANDAs for the drug with paragraph IV certifications, and Biovail 
promptly filed infringement actions against each.116  All four patent 
lawsuits settled.117  Thereafter, direct and indirect purchasers of 
Wellbutrin XL filed antitrust litigation against Biovail, alleging 
numerous anticompetitive acts including sham litigation.118  Biovail 
moved for summary judgment on various grounds, arguing inter alia 
that its infringement action against one of the generics—Abrika—was 
per se reasonable (and hence not a sham) because Abrika refused to 
under its gabapentin patents is presumptively immune from antitrust scrutiny under the 
Noerr-Pennington doctrine. However, Warner-Lambert is not entitled to such immunity if 
Plaintiffs can establish that the ‘476, ‘479, and ‘482 infringement actions were ‘sham 
litigation.’ ” ). 
 112. Id.  Specifically, Plaintiffs averred that Defendants knew or recklessly disregarded 
the fact that the ‘476 patent was not infringed by the generic’s drug, and yet still initiated 
infringement actions.  Id.  With respect to the ‘479 patent actions, Plaintiffs claimed that 
Warner-Lambert brought suit against the generic manufacturers without evidence of 
knowledge and intent to induce infringement, while knowing that none of the generic 
applicants sought approval to market generic gabapentin to treat neurodegenerative diseases.  
Id.  Finally, Plaintiffs argued that they have sufficiently alleged that “no reasonable litigant 
would believe that the [‘482 patent’s claims] could ultimately be upheld as valid, definite, 
and/or infringed, [b]ecause of the inability to measure chloride ions from a mineral acid at 
the low levels specified by the ‘482 patent, or to distinguish the level of chloride ions from a 
mineral acid in the claim from the prior art.”  Id. at *21 (internal quotations marks omitted). 
 113. In re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litig., Nos. 08–2431 (direct), 08–2433 (indirect), 
2012 WL 1657734 (E.D. Pa. May 11, 2012). 
 114. Id. at *1–2.  Prior formulations of Wellbutrin included a rapid release formulation 
that was to be taken three times a day, Wellbutrin IR, and a sustained release formulation, 
Wellbutrin SR.  Id.  The later was brought to market in 1997 and was also the subject of 
antitrust litigation. See, e.g., In re Wellbutrin SR Antitrust Litig., No. Civ.A. 04–5525, 
Civ.A. 04–5898, Civ.A. 05–396, 2006 WL 616292 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 9, 2006). 
 115. Wellbutrin,  2012 WL 1657734 at *3. 
 116. Impax, Waston, Anchen, and Abrika were the four generics that filed ANDAs.  
Although the ‘327 patent was listed in the Orange book and was claimed to be infringed in 
some of the ANDA litigation, the infringement claims on the ‘327 were eventually dropped 
in all suits.  Id. at *5 n.8.  Only the ‘341 patent was at issue in the antitrust cases.  Id. at *5  
 117. Id. at *6. 
 118. Id. at *1.  The suit also was brought against GlaxoSmithKlein, which was the 
distributor of Wellbutrin XL.  Id.   
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supply it with samples, and thus Biovail was unable to do a proper 
infringement analysis prior to filing suit.119 
The court rejected Biovail’s argument that its conduct should be 
per se reasonable.120  Rather, according to the court, while inability to 
obtain a sample may excuse a patentee from conducting a proper 
infringement analysis prior to filing suit, the litigation could still be a 
sham if Biovail’s interpretation of its patent claims was 
unreasonable.121  Thus, the Court not only rejected immunity for filing 
the lawsuit, but did so even when a pre-litigation infringement analysis 
was not possible due to the generic’s conduct.  Nevertheless, the Court 
did grant summary judgment for patentees in all four infringement 
actions—including the Abrika action122—after concluding that the facts 
did not support the plaintiffs’ theory.123 
These cases demonstrate that courts recognize antitrust claims for 
filing sham litigation in the Hatch-Waxman regulatory context.  
Moreover, although the cases focused on the filing of the suit, it is 
evident from the decisions that maintaining the litigation may be 
considered in evaluating anticompetitive effects. 
B. Frivolous and/or “Bad Faith” Cases Predicated on Baseless 
Infringement 
The cases discussed in this part involve requests for fees in 
defending frivolous or “bad faith” litigation, brought pursuant to Rule 
 119. Id. at *13. 
 120. Id. at *17. 
 121. Id. at *13 (“The defendants argue as a preliminary matter that in the Hatch-
Waxman context, they had a reasonable basis to institute suit against Abrika because Abrika 
did not provide pre-filing access to its ANDA. . . This argument only holds weight, 
however, if this Court agrees that the defendants could reasonably expect success on the 
merits of their claim construction argument . . . .’”) (citations omitted). 
 122. Id. at *17.  In the Abrika action the court granted summary judgment for Biovail 
because it concluded that the litigation—even if it were a sham—did not delay Abrika from 
launching its generic and thus did not cause anticompetitive harm.  Id.  Specifically, the 
thirty month stay caused by the allegedly baseless litigation expired over a year before 
Abrika obtained FDA approval for its generic.  Consequently, the court concluded that the 
litigation was not the cause of Abrika’s delay and thus, Abrika could not have sustained 
competitive harm due to the litigation.  Id.   
 123. Id.  Specifically, for three of the infringement actions, the issue was primarily 
whether Biovail’s interpretation of claims in the ‘341 patent were objectively baseless.  
Although it found that Biovail’s interpretations were questionable, the court concluded that 
they were not objectively baseless and thereby not a sham.  Id. at *8–9, *11, *19.  On the 
fourth infringement action, the court did not directly address whether the litigation was a 
sham, but rather granted summary judgment on grounds that even if it were, there was 
insufficient evidence of anticompetitive harm.  Id. at *17.  While the court believed that 
patentees had a “colorable legal argument” in support of its infringement claims (and thus 
was not baseless), it declined to make a finding on that issue.  Id. at *15, *17.  
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11 and/or Section 285.  Because Rule 11 and Section 285 cases may 
also be based upon objectively baseless infringement claims—and thus 
may potentially support antitrust claims as well—they are worth 
examining. 
1. Prilosec OTC 
AstraZeneca v. Dr. Reddy’s124 concerned an over-the-counter 
version of the popular heartburn drug omeprazole magnesium, 
marketed by AstraZeneca as Prilosec OTC.  AstraZeneca listed two 
patents in the Orange Book for the drug, which claimed a particular 
crystalline formulation of omeprazole magnesium and the process used 
in manufacturing it.125  Dr. Reddy’s (among others) submitted an 
ANDA with a paragraph IV certification asserting, inter alia, that its 
ANDA did not infringe the patents listed for Prilosec OTC.126  After 
two years of discovery, during which Dr. Reddy’s provided samples of 
its generic and access to its Drug Master File, as well as responses to 
AstraZeneca’s deposition and interrogatory requests, the court granted 
summary judgment of non-infringement.127 
Thereafter, the court granted Dr. Reddy’s motion for fees under 
Section 285, citing various grounds evidencing that the case was 
frivolous and “nothing more than an effort to keep a legitimate 
competitor out of the market on flimsy-to-nonexistent grounds.”128  
First, the Court found AstraZeneca’s interpretation of its claims wholly 
unreasonable.129  Specifically, the court concluded that despite the 
patent being “easy to understand,” the patentee put forth a “tortured 
claim construction,” arguing for an interpretation of its claims that was 
“inherently self-contradictory” and which “made “absolutely no 
sense.”130  Second, the court believed that non-infringement could 
easily be determined via a straight-forward comparison of the branded 
product (and process) with the generic product (and process).131  Third, 
 124. AstraZeneca AB v. Dr. Reddy’s Labs, Ltd., No. 07 Civ. 6790 (CM), 2010 WL 
1375176 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2010). 
 125. See id. at *2–3. 
 126. See id. at *2. 
 127. Id. at *2–3. 
 128. Id. at *5, *6, *9.  The court also suggested that the action may violate Rule 11.  Id.  
at *6. 
 129. AstraZeneca, 2010 WL 1375176 at *8. 
 130. Id. at *8. 
 131. Id. at *1. (“That the process used by defendants to create omeprazole magnesium 
did not read on plaintiffs’ patent was apparent from a reading of the patent and a description 
of defendants’ process for creating the popular drug Prilosec OTC. Indeed, defendants’ 
products and process are in key respects exactly the opposite of what plaintiffs claim in their 
patents.”)  The court also found that non-infringement of the formulation patents was simple 
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according to the court, notwithstanding substantial evidence of non-
infringement (both pre-litigation and early on in the suit) and an offer 
by Dr. Reddy’s of a “reasonable way to resolve [the] lawsuit 
expeditiously,” AstraZeneca continued to litigate and sought “wide-
ranging discovery.”132  Fourth, the court found that up to and including 
summary judgment, AstraZeneca “never put forward any evidence of 
infringement and any reasonably party would have known that [the] 
action should have been terminated early.”133  Finally, the court 
determined that the suit was brought and maintained solely for an 
improper purpose, i.e., to deter generic competition.134 
2. Amrix 
In re Cyclobenzaprine hydrochloride Extended Release Capsule 
Patent Litigation,135 involved cyclobenzaprine hydrochloride capsules, 
a skeletal muscle relaxant.  The drug is marketed as Amrix, and rights 
to the drug are shared by several companies (“patentees”).136  Two 
patents were listed in the Orange Book for Amrix:  7,387,793 (‘793) 
(claiming an extended release dosage form of skeletal muscle 
relaxants), and 7,544,372 (‘372) (claiming a method of relieving 
muscle spasms with the extended release formulation).137  Various 
generic manufacturers submitted ANDAs for the drug, including 
Anchen.138  Upon receiving paragraph IV certifications, patent 
litigation was initiated against each company.139  In granting summary 
judgment of non-infringement for Anchen, the court emphasized that 
not only did patentees fail to provide any evidence as to Anchen’s 
infringement, but even admitted that the ANDA did not infringe the 
to ascertain because there was “no evidence whatever that DRL makes or uses a salt with 
the requisite degree of crystallinity” and that AstraZeneca’s experts did not “suggest any 
reason why the process and apparatus used by DRL would result in a finished product 
containing 70%-or-more crystalline omeprazole magnesium.”  Id. at *5 (emphasis added). 
 132. Id. at *1, *6.  
 133. AstraZeneca, 2010 WL 1375176 at *4.  See also Id. at *6 (“All the discovery in the 
world would not give Astra a stronger argument against dismissal .....” (Slip op. at 31 n. 5.) 
But of course, “all the discovery in the world” is what Astra wanted-and it wanted that 
discovery in order to keep defendants' product off the market for as long as possible.”). 
 134. Id. at *1 (“It was obvious from very early on that plaintiffs had brought and were 
maintaining this lawsuit in a desperate effort to keep any competing product from hitting the 
shelves-even if the competing product was not an infringing product.”).  
 135. In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended-Release Capsule Patent Litig., 794 
F. Supp. 2d 517 (D. Del. 2011), rev’d on other grounds, 676 F.3d 1063 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 136. Id. at 523. 
 137. See id. at 524–25. 
 138. See id. at 522. 
 139. Id. at 523. 
 
ZAIN FINAL 8/21/2014  4:08 PM 
752 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54 
patents.140 
Shortly after being granted summary judgment, Anchen filed a 
Section 285 motion for attorney’s fees, arguing that the infringement 
action was baseless and initiated solely to deter generic competition by 
“improperly invoke[ing] an FDA stay of approval of Anchen’s 
ANDA.”141  While the court disagreed that the evidence demonstrated 
that the litigation was frivolous at the time filed, it agreed that it 
became frivolous at a later time.142  In particular, the court found 
significant that patentees failed to provide any evidence of 
infringement and even conceded that Anchen’s ANDA did not 
infringe.143  The court concluded that the case was “exceptional” and 
granted fees, holding that there was sufficient evidence that “the suit 
became unjustifiable once plaintiff’s declined to acknowledge that 
there was no need to maintain the suit.”144 
As with the cases discussed in the prior section, these cases 
evidence situations where baseless litigation was brought and 
maintained to delay competition.  And while antitrust claims were not 
made in these cases, they potentially could have been.  Finally, it is 
worth emphasizing that the Amrix decision made clear that even if a 
suit was not baseless at the time filed, if it becomes so at a later time, a 
party has a duty to dismiss the suit or else face potential liability for 
failing to do so. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
As evidenced by the cases discussed, filing and maintaining 
baseless lawsuits may have anticompetitive effects.  And while the 
cases focused primarily on initiation of litigation, it was recognized 
that maintaining the actions was also improper.  Indeed, where 
maintaining baseless litigation has anticompetitive effects, there is no 
compelling rationale for creating a legal distinction between the filing 
 140. Id. at 523 n.3.  In contrast, the court concluded that several of the other generic’s 
formulations did infringe the listed patents.  See id. 
 141. In re Cyclobenzaprine hydrochloride Extended-Release Capsule Patent Litig., Civ. 
No. 09–MD–2118–SLR, 2012 WL 95592, at *1–2 (D. Del. Jan 12, 2012). 
 142. Id. at *3 n.8.  In concluding that filing suit was not a sham, the court appeared to 
find significant that Anchen refused to provide ANDA samples prior to litigation due to 
purported confidentiality concerns and an inability to come to terms on a confidentiality 
agreement.  See id. at *2.  The court thus seemed sympathetic to patentees assertion that that 
they had no choice but to sue. See id.  
 143. Id. at *2 n.4. 
 144. Id. at *3 n.8. Although patentees attempted to justify maintaining the suit to 
“police” against possible ANDA reformulations by Anchen, the court rejected this 
argument, concluding that there were existing safeguards for such concerns.  Id. at *1–3. 
 
ZAIN FINAL 8/21/2014  4:08 PM 
2014] LIABILITY OF BASELESS LITIGATION 753 
and maintaining of a baseless action.145  And in situations where a 
litigant is able to offer a questionable but potentially legitimate basis 
for filing an action (thereby making the suit unlikely to qualify as a 
sham), the greater need for imposing liability for continuing to litigate 
after it becomes clear that the action is meritless.  Consequently, this 
section provides the argument for antitrust liability for maintaining 
baseless litigation. 
A. Antitrust Sham Litigation for Maintaining Baseless Litigation is 
Good Policy 
There are several justifications for imposing antitrust liability for 
continuing to litigate a baseless action for anticompetitive purposes.  
And where such litigation may cause anticompetitive effects—such as 
in Hatch-Waxman litigation—the potential for incurring antitrust 
liability may be an important deterrent. 
First, antitrust liability is needed because laws prohibiting 
frivolous and bad faith litigation (such as Section 285 or Rule 11), are 
inadequate deterrents in many situations.  Granting fees under Section 
285 is largely within a court’s discretion, and thus a court may decline 
to impose fees in even egregious circumstances.146  Similarly, Rule 11 
is not only discretional, but several courts have interpreted it as only 
governing the filing of litigation and thereby rejected its application to 
conduct done in the course of litigation (including continuing to 
 145. The best argument for imposing such a distinction would be if the filing of the 
action has a particular anticompetitive effect, separate and apart from maintaining the action.  
In the Hatch-Waxman content, this may be the case, as the filing of an infringement action 
upon receiving a paragraph IV certification triggers a thirty-month stay of FDA approval for 
the generic.  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).  Moreover, the effect of dismissing the action on 
the thirty-month stay is not clear—which obviously impacts any anticompetitive effect of 
both filing and maintaining the litigation.  Compare In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust 
Litig., 335 F. Supp. 2d 1336, 1344 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (“A dismissal of the Hatch-Waxman 
infringement lawsuit lifts the 30 month stay.”), with Endo Pharms. v. Mylan Techs., No. 11–
220–GMS, 2013 WL 936452, at *5 (D. Del. Mar. 11, 2013) (concluding in dicta that 
dismissal of Hatch-Waxman litigation will not extinguish the 30 month stay, since “[i]f 
Congress had wished the thirty month stay to be extinguished upon a dismissal without 
prejudice, it would have said as much.”).  In 1999, the FDA proposed a rule that included 
extinguishing the 30 month stay upon dismissal of the patent litigation, but the proposal was 
withdrawn.  See 180-Day Generic Exclusivity for Abbreviated New Drug Applications, 64 
Fed. Reg. 42873, 42886 (proposed Aug. 6, 1999) (withdrawn in 67 Fed. Reg. 66593 (Nov. 
1, 2002)). 
 146. See, e.g., Raylon, LLC v. Complus Data Innovations, Inc., 700 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 
2012), where the Federal Circuit reversed a District Court’s denial of fees under Rule 11 and 
Section 285, finding that patentees’ claims construction was clearly frivolous and 
unreasonable and neither supported by any part of the patent (e.g. claims, specification, 
preferred embodiment) nor the prosecutorial history.  See infra Part IV.B, 
 
ZAIN FINAL 8/21/2014  4:08 PM 
754 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54 
maintain a baseless action).147  Moreover, the remedies available under 
these provisions—mostly payment of defendant’s fees and costs—are 
not particularly onerous and thus not likely to discourage frivolous 
litigation.  As monopoly profits may be quite large, a firm may well be 
quite content risking having to pay fees and even sanctions (in contrast 
to the risk of treble damages for antitrust violations). 
Second, to the extent that continuing to litigate a baseless action is 
anticompetitive, there is no rational basis for only imposing liability on 
the filing of the action but not on maintaining it.  And where the 
litigation circumvents legislative policies, such as those created by the 
Hatch-Waxman Act, it should be prevented to the fullest extent 
possible.  Thus, imposing liability on both filing and maintaining 
baseless, anticompetitive litigation would likely have the favorable 
effect of further deterring such deleterious conduct. 
Third, successfully proving an antitrust claim is a difficult task, 
requiring not only demonstrating anticompetitive effects in most cases, 
but also various procedural hurdles.  Consequently, concerns that 
imposing antitrust liability for maintaining baseless litigation could 
“open the floodgates” to additional antitrust litigation is 
unwarranted.148  Indeed, outside of the context of the Hatch-Waxman 
Act (or a similar type of regulatory scheme), proving anticompetitive 
effects of sham litigation may well be difficult. 
B. Evaluating Cases for Potential Antitrust Liability 
While antitrust liability should be imposed against companies 
which maintain anticompetitive, frivolous lawsuits, determining 
whether a particular action is baseless and anticompetitive may be quite 
difficult.  Indeed, there may be significant legal and practical 
difficulties in establishing a prima facie antitrust claim, much less 
proving it.  Nevertheless, by focusing on Hatch-Waxman cases, this 
section suggests several potential criteria that may assist in identifying 
appropriate cases. 
The first criterion evaluated is the litigant’s efforts (or lack 
thereof) in ascertaining infringement prior to filing suit.  If a patentee 
 147. See, e.g., Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs. Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 874 (5th Cir. 1988); 
Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 484 (3d Cir. 1987); Pantry Queen Foods v. Lifschultz 
Fast Freight, Inc., 809 F.2d 451, 454 (7th Cir. 1987); Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 
1274 (2d Cir. 1986). 
 148. It is possible that antitrust liability for maintaining baseless litigation might result in 
additional antitrust litigation to the extent that it addresses statute of limitations problems.  
That is, in cases where the filing of a lawsuit is the sole alleged anticompetitive act and is 
outside the limitations period, the act of maintaining the action might save the claim from 
dismissal (assuming at least some of the litigation is within the limitations period).   
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failed to take reasonable steps to evaluate infringement prior to 
litigation, this may be indicative that the action was filed (and 
maintained) for an improper purpose.  For example, the court in In re 
Neurontin Antitrust Litigation denied a motion to dismiss the antitrust 
claim in part due to allegations that the patentee never tested or 
examined the allegedly infringing product prior to filing suit.149 
Second is examining whether a patentee continuously insists upon 
an interpretation of its patent claims that is nonsensical, wholly 
unsupported, or contradicted by either the patent’s specification or its 
own assertions made before the P.T.O.  For example, Raylon v. 
Complus Data150 involved Raylon’s patent for a hand-held ticketing 
device that contained its own internal keypad and printer and included 
a display that was “pivotally mounted on” the device.151  The patent 
 149. In re Neurontin Antitrust Litig., Nos. 02-1830 (FSH), 02-2731(FSH), 02-
5583(FSH), 2009 WL 2751029, at *23 (D.N.J. Aug. 28, 2009).  Cf. Eon-Net LP v. Flagstar 
Bancorp, 653 F.3d 1314, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (finding Rule 11 sanction where the patentee 
“failed to perform a pre-suit investigation.”); Judin v. United States, 110 F.3d 780, 784–85 
(Fed. Cir. 1997) (Rule 11 sanctions against patentee based in part on fact that patentee never 
attempted to obtain a copy of the alleged infringing product); Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. 
Genpharm, Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 367, 380 (D. N.J. 1999) (“The resolution of the question 
whether plaintiffs’ suit is objectively baseless as to Genpharm involves the determination of 
whether plaintiffs undertook a reasonable investigation before filing suit, whether plaintiffs 
knew or should have known that Genpharm had not infringed the Syntex process patents, 
and whether a reasonable litigant could have realistically expected success on the merits at 
the time the suit was filed.”). 
 150. Raylon, LLC v. Complus Data Innovations, 700 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 151. Id. at 1364–65 (“Claim 1 [of US patent No. 6,655,589] is representative of the 
patented system:  
1. A system for investigating an identification of a person and for issuing tickets, 
the identification comprising a card having a computer readable magnetic tape 
secured on the card, the computer readable magnetic tape containing pertinent data 
relating to the person displayed on the identification card, said system being 
connectable to a computer for transmitting data between said system and the 
computer, said system being connectable to a data cable of a computer, said 
system comprising: 
 
a housing having an interior, said housing having an elongated slot for selectively 
receiving the identification card, said housing having an elongated aperture 
providing access into said interior of said housing;  
 
an input assembly for inputting data about a person, said input assembly being 
mounted on said housing, said input assembly including a data reading means for 
reading the computer readable magnetic tape on the identification card; 
 
a transceiver assembly for remotely communicating with a computer, said 
transceiver assembly being mounted in said interior of said housing; 
 
a display for displaying data entered into said input assembly, said display being 
pivotally mounted on said housing;  
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included a drawing that illustrated the invention’s preferred 
embodiment, which was comprised of (among other things) a 
rectangular body with buttons for entering data, a location where 
tickets could be printed out, and a separate display attached to the 
device.152  Raylon filed patent infringement actions against various 
software and hardware manufacturers of hand-held ticketing devices.153  
In defending the lawsuits, several defendants countered that their 
products could not infringe on Raylon’s patent because their devices 
had rigid, fixed-mounted displays that could not be pivoted.154  Raylon 
did not contest that defendants’ products contained fixed-mounted, 
non-pivoting displays, but nonetheless maintained that defendants’ 
devices infringed its patents because those devices could be manually 
pivoted, i.e., by the person holding the device.155 
The District Court rejected Raylon’s arguments as one which 
“stretch[es] the bounds of reasonableness,” because it was unsupported 
by the evidence and would essentially ignore the “pivotally mounted” 
limitation of the patent.156  Nevertheless, the District Court denied 
defendant’s motion for sanctions and fees under Rule 11 and Section 
285.157  On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed, holding that Raylon’s 
interpretation of “pivotally mounted” was “frivolous” and 
“unreasonable” because the patent’s claims, specifications, and 
preferred embodiment all clearly “show[] a display that is mounted to 
pivot relative to the housing on which it is attached.”158  Moreover, the 
 
a printer assembly being mounted in said interior of said housing for printing a 
ticket; and wherein said printer assembly includes 
 
a substrate for receiving indicia, said substrate including an end extendable 
through said elongated aperture in said housing, 
 
a printer means for printing indicia on said substrate, and means for advancing 
said substrate with respect to said printer means such that substrate is advanced 
though said elongated aperture in said housing when said printer means prints 
indicia on said substrate. Independent system claims 16 and 17 also recite a 
display being pivotally mounted on said housing limitation.”) (citations omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  
 152. See id. at 1363–64. 
 153. See id. at 1363. 
 154. See id. at 1366. 
 155. Id. at 1365 (“In other words, under Raylon’s theory of infringement a display with 
a fixed-mounted screen meets the ‘pivotally mounted on said housing’ limitation when the 
user pivots the device by moving his elbow, wrist, or other joint.”).  
 156. Id. at 1365–66. 
 157. Id. at 1366. 
 158. Id. at 1367–69 (“Applying the objectively reasonable standard, we agree with 
defendants that Raylon’s claim construction (and thus infringement contentions) were 
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Federal Circuit concluded that Raylon’s construction was unsupported 
by the patent prosecution history (made before the P.T.O) and “does 
not conform to the standard canons of claims construction.”159 
Third is examining whether a patentee inexorably asserts 
infringement, even after discovery and evaluation of the accused 
product(s) or method(s) substantiate non-infringement.  For example, 
in AstraZeneca v. Dr. Reddy’s, the court was critical of AstraZeneca’s 
continued position that Dr. Reddy’s generic product infringed its 
formulation patent despite substantial evidence that Dr. Reddy’s 
formulation was not 70% crystalline, as required by the asserted 
patent.160  Similarly, the court in In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride 
Extended Release Capsule Patent Litigation granted fees under Section 
285 in part because patentee maintained its lawsuit despite failing to 
frivolous. . . . Raylon’s claim construction of ‘display pivotally mounted on said housing’ is 
a prime example of a construction that falls below this threshold. Raylon, throughout the 
litigation, argued that this term should be construed as requiring a ‘display being capable of 
being moved or pivoted relative to the viewer’s perspective.’  Its construction encompasses 
any portable device with a display, regardless of how it is mounted to the housing . . . . 
     [Moreover], [t]hroughout the specification, the patentee describes the invention as 
containing a display that ‘is pivotally mounted on the housing.’ A display pivotally mounted 
on the housing is even identified by the patentee as one of the important features of the 
invention. Figure 1, the only schematic of the preferred embodiment, shows a display that is 
mounted to pivot relative to the housing on which it is attached.”) (citations omitted). 
 159. Id. at 1369. Accord Eon-Net LP v. Flagstar Bancorp, 653 F.3d 1314, 1326 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011) (“[B]ecause the written description clearly refutes Eon-Net’s claim construction, 
the district court did not clearly err in finding the Eon-Net pursued objectively baseless 
infringement claims.”); Phonometrics v. Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc., No. 02-1360, 2003 WL 
2008126, at *1 (Fed. Cir. April 29, 2003) (“[I]t was clear after we issued the claim 
construction in Northern Telecom that Choice Hotels did not infringe U.S. Patent No. 
3,769,463 (“the ‘463 patent”).  The district court thus concluded that [b]ecause Plaintiff 
continued to litigate this case knowing that its claim could not meet the standard for 
infringement of the ‘463 patent articulated by the Federal Circuit, this case is exceptional. . . 
.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 160. AstraZeneca AB v. Dr. Reddy’s Labs., Ltd., No. 07 Civ. 6790(CM), 2010 WL 
1375176, *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2010).  Accord Nabi Biopharmaceuticals v. Roxane Labs., 
No. 2:05-CV-889, 2007 WL 894473, *3 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 21, 2007) (refusing to dismiss a 
sham litigation claim against Nabi where the court found that Roxane provided samples and 
documents that “demonstrated that Roxane’s proposed calcium acetate capsules are made 
from calcium acetate with a bulk density outside of the range claimed in the 665 patent and 
utilizing untabletted powder within a capsule, not compressed into a caplet as required by 
the claims of the 665 patent.”). In contrast, where a patentee voluntarily dismisses an 
infringement action after discovery indicated non-infringement, a court is less likely to find 
that the litigation was a sham.  See, e.g., Kaiser Found. Health Plan v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 
552 F.3d 1033, 1047 (9th Cir. 2012) (“It is true that Abbott was litigious, but to some degree 
its litigiousness was a product of Hatch-Waxman.  Abbott filed suit quickly in order to 
preserve its rights under Hatch-Waxman, but it did not persist in litigating when it became 
obvious that the suits were baseless.”); Q-Pharma, Inc. v. The Andrews Jergen Co., 360 F.3d 
1295 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Invamed, Inc., 213 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 
2000). 
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provide any evidence of infringement as to certain claims—even as late 
as trial.161 
Fourth, litigation misconduct may evince that the action was 
initiated and maintained for an improper purpose.  For example, in 
AstraZeneca v. Dr. Reddy’s, one factor in the court’s awarding of fees 
was patentee’s discovery abuses, i.e., its “wide-ranging” discovery 
requests which were a mere “fishing-expedition” done for the purpose 
of deterring competition.162  Similarly, engaging in a pattern of dubious 
litigation may suggest an improper purpose, particularly when the 
allegations made in the various actionsappear weak and/or 
unreasonable. 163 
Finally, evaluating anticompetitive effects of litigation is also an 
important consideration in identifying suitable antitrust cases.  In the 
Hatch-Waxman context, filing and maintaining baseless litigation is 
likely to impede competition in cases where it delays generic entry.  In 
other contexts, it may be far more difficult to demonstrate that sham 
litigation, either by itself or along with other conduct, is 
anticompetitive. 
Applying these criteria will assist in identifying appropriate cases 
for potential antitrust liability.  And while the criteria discussed focuses 
 161. In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended-Release Capsule Patent Litig., 
2012 WL 95592, at *1 (D. Del. Jan. 12, 2012).  Accord AstraZeneca, 2010 WL 1375176, at 
*4 (“Astra never put forth any evidence of infringement and any reasonable party would 
have known that this action should have been terminated early.”). 
 162. AstraZeneca, 2010 WL 1375176 at *6 (‘ “ [A]ll the discovery in the world’ is what 
Astra wanted-and it wanted that discovery in order to keep defendants’ product off the 
market for as long as possible.’  One of the ways in which Astra needlessly prolonged this 
litigation, and increased the cost of defending it, was to insist on wide-ranging discovery-
even going so far as to tell the court that Hatch-Waxman litigation was supposed to require 
lots of discovery.  A determination that Astra maintained this action in bad faith is supported 
by my findings that, ‘Astra was a party in search of a theory on which to proceed,’  that 
Astra ‘obviously wanted unlimited discovery,’ and that Astra’s discovery requests ‘smack of 
a fishing expedition.’”) (citations and ellipsis omitted). Accord Eon-Net LP v. Flagstar 
Bancorp, 653 F.3d 1314, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (various litigation conduct found, including 
not engaging in claim construction process in “good faith,” evasive conduct, and an overall 
“lack of regard for the judicial system” as evidenced by depositions and interrogatory 
responses.). 
 163. Beckman Instruments v. LKB Produkter AB, 892 F.2d 1547, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1989) 
(“[T]he district court’s finding of exceptional circumstances is based on a strategy of 
vexatious activity.”); Eon-Net, 653 F.3d at 1324, 1327 (patentee’s “numerous instances of 
litigation misconduct,” which included filing dozens of baseless suits “to extract a nuisance 
value settlement” all supported an award of fees under Section 285).  Cf. Cal. Motor Transp. 
v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972) (“[A] pattern of baseless, repetitive claims 
may emerge which leads the fact finder to conclude that the administrative and judicial 
processes have been abused”); Primetime 24 Joint Venture v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 219 F.3d 92, 
101 (2d Cir. 2000); USS-POSCO Indus. v. Contra Costa County Bldg. & Constr. Trades 
Council, 31 F.3d 800, 810–11 (9th Cir. 1994).  
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on patent litigation in the Hatch-Waxman context, several may be 
applied in other contexts.  For example, a lack of due diligence in 
evaluating the strength of one’s claim prior to filing suit may be 
indicative of improper motive in nearly any action.  Similarly, 
continuing to take an unreasonable and unsupportable position 
throughout litigation concerning the language of a relevant document 
(such as a contract)—particularly if inconsistent or even contradicted 
by other evidence—is likely to suggest an improper motive for the 
litigation.  Finally, misconduct during the course of litigation surely 
happens in all types of cases, and in certain situations may evidence 
that the litigation is being maintained for an improper purpose. 
CONCLUSION 
Maintaining objectively baseless litigation may violate the 
antitrust laws.  While it is beyond dispute that filing objectively 
baseless litigation may be the basis for antitrust liability, there is little 
case law on whether and when maintaining baseless litigation may be 
so as well. 
Antitrust concerns with maintaining baseless litigation extend far 
beyond the pharmaceutical context.  Rather, the focus on 
pharmaceutical cases is primarily due to the author’s familiarity with 
the field, the importance of pharmaceuticals as a national issue, and the 
common (though not universal) view that there is substantial 
anticompetitive conduct occurring in the pharmaceutical industry.  
Additionally, due to certain unique features of its regulatory context, 
demonstrating anticompetitive effects of maintaining baseless litigation 
is likely to be easier in pharmaceutical litigation than in other contexts. 
Antitrust claims for maintaining baseless litigation are not likely 
to become common—even in pharmaceutical cases.  The difficulty of 
meeting various, formidable substantive and procedural requirements 
for antitrust liability will likely limit the viability of pleading and 
proving such claims.  Nevertheless, even if not-often used, it could be a 
“big stick” to assist in combating anticompetitive conduct and deterring 
frivolous litigation. 
